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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clayton Adams appeals from the Judgment and Commitment entered upon a jury
verdict finding him guilty of one count of second degree murder and one count of
aggravated battery. Mr. Adams was sentenced to a unified term of life, with twenty-five
years fixed, for the murder conviction, and a consecutive term of ten years, with three
years fixed, for the aggravated battery conviction. Mr. Adams timely appealed and now
raises the following issues.
First, Mr. Adams asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial
and right to a fair trial when the district court failed to remove a juror who candidly
admitted that she felt it was unfair that a court in a criminal trial would withhold evidence
from the jury. Juror 608 stated that she would merely do her best not to hold against
Mr. Adams, instances during the trial where information was withheld from her. Second,
Mr. Adams asserts that he was denied his right to a fair trial by the prosecutor appealing
to the passions of the jury when, during closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury
to give the alleged victims, and Mr. Adams, "justice." Third, Mr. Adams asserts that if
the above errors are deemed individually harmless, the combination of having a biased
juror sit in his case and the prosecutorial misconduct that occurred requires reversal of
his conviction under the doctrine of cumulative error. Finally, Mr. Adams asserts that
the district court abused its discretion by executing an excessive sentence in light of the
specific facts and circumstances of this case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
After a Criminal Complaint was filed and a preliminary hearing held (R., pp.13-16,
25-26), the State filed an Information charging Mr. Adams with the following crimes: 1)
one count of first degree murder committed in the course of a felony, or alternatively,
through premeditation; 2) one count of aggravated battery; and 3) three counts of
attempted robbery. (R., pp.27-31) The case proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.112-156.)
During Voir Dire, Juror 608 informed the parties that she had previously served
on a jury in a drug case in Ada County. (Tr., Vol.ll, p.248, L.19 - p.249, L.6.) When
asked by the prosecutor how she rated the experience, she stated, "I didn't care for it."
(Tr., Vol.ll, p.249, Ls.7-9) When asked to explain, Juror 608 expressed the following:
I was disappointed. At the end, the prosecutor said if you have questions,
you know, stay in the room and we'll come in and answer. And I didn't like
that, as jurors, we weren't given what I thought was all of the information,
you know, that the courts are very selective about what jurors can hear.
It's like we want you to sit up there, we want you to rule or do whatever it
is you do, but we're only going to give you this little piece, and then you
have to make your decision with that. I wanted -the things that he told us
afterwords about the case that he could not present, I didn't understand
the reasons why they couldn't, so I didn't care for that.
(Tr., Vol.11, p.249, Ls.10-23.) The prosecutor asked whether she got "the feeling there
were things you weren't being told" to which he answered, "yes." (Tr., Vol.11, p.250,
Ls.2-5.) The prosecutor further asked if that bothered her to which she responded as
follows:

-

Yes. I didn't like having to - it was like every three minutes a word would
be mentioned, and it's, oh, juror, leave, come back in five minutes, three
minutes. Later a word is mentioned. Oh, jury's got to leave. It was like,
you know, either stop saying the word or tell us what you're not telling us.
(Tr., Vol.ll, p.250, Ls.6-13.) Juror 608 agreed that she felt like a "lab rat" and in "[slome
type of controlled experiment."

(Tr., Vol.ll, p.250, Ls.14-19.)

Juror 608 further

acknowledged that the questions asked after trial were answered to her satisfaction.
(Tr., Vol.ll, p.250, Ls.20-23.)
Later, defense counsel addressed Juror 608 who reiterated her statements that
she did not like the fact that during her previous jury service, the judge would excuse
the jury at various times during the trial. (Tr., Vol.ll, p.312, Ls.2-13.) Juror 608 further
stated that defense counsel in the previous case did not speak with the jurors after the
trial, only the prosecutor spoke with the jurors for about fifteen or twenty minutes.
(Tr., Vol.ll, p.312, L.14 - p.313, L.11.) The following exchange then took place:
MR. ONANUBOSI (defense counsel): You know, there might be an
occasion, an instance or occasion where we might have to take up some
legal issues, and we might have to do that in the absence of the jury.
JUROR NO. 608: Yes.
MR. ONANUBOSI: That we might have to excuse the jury. Will
you promise me that you will not hold that against either myself or the
State if that happens in this case?
JUROR NO. 608: Do I promise? No
MR. ONANUBOSI: You cannot promise that?
JUROR NO. 608: (Shakes head.)
MR. ONANUBOSI: Okay. At least will you be willing to promise
me that you will not be willing to hold that against Mr. Adams, the
individual I'm trying to help over here?

THE COURT: Counsel, with all due respect, I'm not going to allow
you to require her to promise.
MR. ONANUBOSI: Okay. Will you be willing to do your best to
make sure if that happens in this case, you do not hold that against
Mr. Adams, the individual I'm trying to help in this case?
JUROR NO. 608: Yes, I will do my best.

MR. ONANUBOSI: You will do your best. That's all we can ask
for.

(Tr., VoI.11, p.313, L.12 - p.314, L.12.) Juror 608 sat on the jury and rendered a verdict
against Mr. Adams. (Tr., Vol.ll, p.350, Ls.?7-20; Tr., Vol.lll, p.997, Ls.21-23.) During
the course of the trial, the jury was sent out of the court room by the district court after
being made aware that the parties would be discussing whether, among other things,
evidence would be allowed to be presented on multiple occasions. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.149,
L.23 - p.150, L.9; p.174, Ls.12-20; p.263, Ls.8-24; p.369, L . l l - p.370, L.lO; p.442,
Ls.10-20; p.529, Ls.8-21; 553, Ls.1-11; p.656, L.23 - p.657, L.4; p.686, L.22 - p.687,
~.5.)'
During the opening arguments, both the state and counsel for Mr. Adams laid out
their theories of the case. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.35, L.9 - p.53, L.3.) In essence, the State's
theory of the case was that after a night where all were drinking, and while giving Mikeal
Campbell, Stephen Maylin, and Tyler Gorley a ride, Mr. Adams demanded money from
the three, threatening them with violence if they did not agree and, when they refused,
he stopped the car, attacked the three with a knife, stabbed Mr. Maylin once, and
stabbed Mr. Gorley five times causing his death. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.35, L.9 - 45, L.1.)
Counsel for Mr. Adams asserted a self-defense claim arguing that Mr. Adams did not
demand money, but requested money as previously arranged, the three in the back
refused and threatened Mr. Adams, Mr. Adams stopped the car, he was attacked, and
used his knife only in self-defense. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.45, L.7 - p.53, L.3.)

The proceedings cited are discussed in further in section I(C) of this brief.

The State called both Mr. Campbell and Mr. Maylin to the stand and they gave
similar accounts of what they allege transpired during the early morning hours of
Saturday, March 11, 2006. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.61, L.2
Campbell); Tr., Vol.lll, p.238, L . l

-

- p.154,

L.l (testimony of Mikeal

p.310, L.12 (testimony of Stephen ~aylin).)'

Although their testimony differed from each other in detail, in essence, both
Mr. Campbell and Mr. Maylin testified to the following relevant facts: Both were drinking
at the Dutch Goose with their friend Tyler Gorley, from Friday March 10, 2006, until
closing early the next morning, and all three were drunk; Mr. Campbell arranged a ride
for the three with Mr. Adams who agreed to take Mr. Maylin home prior to driving the
others to Meridian to purchase beer and then to go to a party; Sergio Madrigal was in
the passenger seat with the other three sitting in the back; Mr. Adams demanded
money from the three in the back to pay for beer and I or gas; the three refused;
Mr. Adams threatened to stab them if they did not turn over the money; the three
continued to refuse; Mr. Adams slammed on the brakes in the middle of the road and
got out of the car; Mr. Adams "hit"3 Mr. Maylin as he tried to get out of the car and
Mr. Maylin ran; Mr. Campbell ran without further confrontation with Mr. Adams;
Mr. Adams got into a fight with Mr. Gorley; and, Mr. Gorley was stabbed and eventually
died from his wounds. Id.

ln the interest of brevity, Mr. Campbell and Mr. Maylin's testimony, along with the
testimony of Sergio Madrigal and Clayton Adams, are presented in this Brief in
summary fashion. The relevance of each witnesses' testimony to the issues raised in
Mr. Adams' appeal are limited to a harmless error analysis. A detailed recitation of the
testimony is not necessary; rather, a summary of the testimony is sufficient to show that
there were disputed issues of fact for the jury to decide.
Later testimony from paramedic Jennifer Wyatt confirmed that Mr. Maylin was stabbed
under his left armpit. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.483, L.11 - p.485, L.21.)

Sergio Madrigal testified that he knew Clayton Adams and they shared drinks at
the Dutch Goose on the night in question. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.310, L.21

- p.369,

L.14

.
testified that at around closing time, he
(testimony of Sergio Madriga~).)~~ rMadrigal
and Mr. Adams agreed to drive to Meridian to get beer and then go to a party; that what
he believed were two people whom he did not know, but it may have been three, rode in
the backseat of the car; that he heard Mr. Adams ask the three to "pitch in" $3 each for
gas; that he could not hear the response of the passengers in the backseat because
music was playing loudly; that Mr. Adams then got mad and said it would now be $10
each; that Mr. Adarns slammed on his brakes and the car skidded to a stop; that
Mr. Adams told the backseat passengers to get out of the car; that he never heard
Mr. Adams threaten the three with violence; that Mr. Adarns and the backseat
passengers got out of the car; that he did not see any fighting; that Mr. Adams got back
in the car and was upset driving fast; that Mr. Adams stated that he thought
Mr. Madrigal was his friend and that he was fighting two people; that Mr. Adams stated
that he thought he stabbed someone, but he was not sure and showed Mr. Madrigal a
knife that he did not see blood on; that Mr. Adams asked him not to tell the police what
happened; and that they eventually bought beer, looked for the party, but could not find
it, and went to Mr. Adams' home where they were arrested. Id.
Clayton Adams testified in his own defense. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.722, L.15 - p.842, L.6;
p.859, L.13 - p.886, L . l l (testimony of Clayton dams).)' Mr. Adams testified that he
was at the Dutch Goose drinking with Mr. Madrigal; that he ran into Mr. Campbell near
closing and agreed to give he and his two friends a ride to get beer and then to go to the
See footnote 2, supra.

party; that Mr. Campbell agreed that they would "pitch in" for gas; that he asked
Mr. Campbell for gas money, but he did not respond; that the other passengers then
told him that they would not give him any money and threatened him; that he was upset
and slammed on the brakes telling the backseat passengers to get out of his car; that
Mr. Maylin and Mr. Campbell did, but Mr. Gorley did not; that he got out of the car to
open the door for Mr. Gorley; that he was then attacked by Mr. Maylin; that Mr. Gorley
then joined the fight and he was fighting two against one; that he remembered he had a
knife and used it in self-defense; that at one point Mr. Gorely took him to the ground;
that he eventually saw an opportunity to get to the driver's seat and leave and he did so;
that he did have the conversation that Mr. Madrigal described generally; that he did not
ask Mr. Madrigal to get rid of the knife and he did not try to get rid of the knife himself;
that they went and bought beer at a gas station where he threw away his ripped up shirt
and he put on another one; and that they tried to find the party, could not do so, and
drove home where he was arrested. Id.
After the court read the closing instructions, the parties proceeded to give their
closing arguments. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.904, L.3

- p.975, L.1.)

Although the record is silent

as to whether Mr. Adams agreed to such a strategy given the fact that he testified that
his actions were in self-defense, defense counsel appeared to argue that the jury should
find Mr. Adams guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter arguing that this
case involved a group of people getting drunk, a sudden quarrel rising to the level of
heat of passion occurred, and the end result was tragic, and that the jury should hold
Mr. Adams responsible for what he did "but no more and no less." (Tr., Vol.lll, p.945,

See footnote 2, supra.
7

1.17 - p.971, L.13.) In their rebuttal, the State argued, "Ijust want to make it real clear
what it is that we are asking for. We are asking for justice." (Tr., Vol.lll, p.973, Ls.2223.) The state continued:
We spoke at the beginning about how on March 1lth
of '06, Clayton
Adams was in the driver's seat, how he's not anymore, that you are. And
as you take that wheel and we slide into the back seat, mere passengers
at this point, we ask one thing, that you take us home, home to justice,
justice for Mike Campbell who watched his friend die, justice for Stephen
Maylin who got stabbed trying to run away from someone he didn't even
know, justice for Tyler Gorley whose death is the reason we are here and
whose life is insulted by the story that he wants you to believe, and justice
for Clayton Adams who did these things, who you know committed these
crimes, and who thought so little of it, that he went and bought beer.
We ask for justice. Thank you.
(Tr., Vol.lll, p.974, L.12-p.975, L.1.)
The jury ultimately acquitted Mr. Adams of all three counts of attempted robbery,
acquitted him of the murder in the first degree charge under both theories, found him
guilty of the lesser charge of second degree murder, and found him guilty of aggravated
battery. (R., pp.157-161.) At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing (see Tr., Vol.lV.,
generally), the district court executed a unified life sentence, with twenty-five years
fixed, for the second degree murder conviction, and a consecutive unified sentence of
ten years, with three years fixed, on the aggravated battery conviction, and entered a
Judgment and Commitment. (R., pp.172-173.) Mr. Adams filed a timely Notice of
Appeal.

(R., pp.176-179.)

Mr. Adams also filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35

(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion which was denied by the court. (R., pp.180-181, 196-

1.

Did the district court deny Mr. Adams his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to
a fair trial when, after Juror 608 candidly admitted that she would hold any
perceived withholding of information against the defendant, the district court
denied Mr. Adams the ability to get an unequivocal assurance from Juror 608
that she would not hold such a withholding of information against Mr. Adams and
when the district court failed to remove the juror?

2.

Did the prosecutor violate Mr. Adams' due process right to a fair trial by
committing misconduct in appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury by
asking them to provide "justice" to the alleged victims and 'Tustice" to Mr. Adams?

3.

Does the combination of the above errors, even if individually harmless, require
reversal of Mr. Adams' convictions under the doctrine of cumulative error?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by executing an excessive sentence
upon Mr. Adams in light of his young age, the role alcohol played in the instant
offense and his desire for treatment, the support he enjoys from his family and
friends, and his remorse?

Mr. Adams did not provide any new information in support of his Rule 35 motion and,
thus, does not raise the denial of his motion as an issue on appeal.

ARGUMENT
1.
The District Court Denied Mr. Adams His Constitutional Rights To A Jurv Trial And To A
Fair Trial When. After Juror 608 Candidlv Admitted That She Would Hold Anv Perceived
Withholding Of lnformation Against The Defendant. The District Court Denied
Mr. Adams The Ability To Get An Unequivocal Assurance From Juror 608 That She
Would Not Hold Such A Withhoidina Of lnformation Against Mr. Adams And When The
District Court Failed To Remove The Juror
A.

Introduction
Juror 608 had previously sat in another criminal trial and expressed her

frustration that she and her fellow jurors were not given the full picture in that case
because of discussions between the parties and the court outside of their presence.
When told by defense counsel that during the course of the trial the jury may be
excused from time to time, Juror 608 candidly stated that she could not promise she
would not hold it against the parties. When defense counsel asked her to promise
specifically not to hold it against Mr. Adams, the district court intervened and forbade
defense counsel from seeking a promise. Juror 608 merely stated that she would do
her best not to hold it against defense counsel.
Like all criminal defendants, Mr. Adams enjoys a right to be tried in front of an
unbiased jury, not in front of jurors who will do their best to be unbiased. Because the
district court denied Mr. Adams the right to require Juror 608 to unequivocally promise
not to hold any perceived withholding of information against him, and because the
district court failed to remove Juror 608, Mr. Adams was denied his right to a jury trial,
and a fair trial, and his conviction must be vacated,

B.

The Riqht To A Fair Trial And The Riqht To A Juw Trial Require That Jurors Be
Unequivocally Unbiased
In criminal cases in Idaho, a defendant's right to a fair trial, in front of impartial

jurors, is protected by both the United States Constitution and the ldaho Constitution.
These rights are embedded in the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment right to
due process of law, the Sixth Amendment right to trial in front of an impartial jury, and
the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. U.S. CONST.amend. V, VI, XIV.
Additionally, The ldaho Constitution recognizes the right to a jury trial through Article I,

37

and the right to due process through Article I, $3 13. Art. I, §§ 7, 13. These

constitutional rights are further embedded in ldaho Code $3 19-1902, 19-2019, and 19202.0,~and ldaho Criminal Rule 24(b).8
Mr. Adams asserts that Juror 608 should have been removed for being acfually
biased, rather than for any of the enumerated categories of implied9 bias.

ldaho

Code § 19-2019(2) defines actual bias as "the existence of a state of mind on the part of
the juror in reference to the case, or to either of the parties, which, in the exercise of a
sound discretion on the part of the trier, leads to the inference that he will not act with
entire imparfialify." I.C. § 19-2019(2) (emphasis added).
Approximately eight months prior to Mr. Adams' trial, the ldaho Court of Appeals,
in a matter of first impression, decided whether the requirement of "impartial" jurors
meant that jurors could merely "try" to be impartial or had to unequivocally state that
they would be impartial. In Sfafe v. Hauser, 143 ldaho 603, 150 P.3d 296 (Ct. App.
Section 19-1902 provides a statutory right to a jury in criminal cases, and sections 792019 and -2020 provided that jurors should be stricken for cause if they are determined
to bring with them actual or implied bias.
Rule 24(b) provides the procedure for making "for cause" challenges.

2007), Juror 31 stated in voir dire that he would likely "give more weight" to testimony of
police officers over the testimony of a defendant. Id. 143 ldaho at 608-609, 150 P.3d at
301-302. Defense counsel moved to remove the juror for cause, but the district court
denied the motion after the prosecutor received an assurance from the juror that he
would "try" to be fair. Id. 143 ldaho at 609, 150 P.3d at 302. After examining precedent
from other jurisdictions analyzing the question of whether an unequivocal assurance
that the juror will be unbiased versus a statement that the juror would "try" to be
unbiased is required, and after analyzing the right under the provisions of the United
States Constitution, the ldaho Constitution, and the statutes mentioned above the Court
of Appeals found as follows:
We agree with those courts that have concluded that any justified doubt
that a venireman can "stand indifferent in the cause" ought to be resolved
in favor of the accused. Justus V . Commonwealth,220 Va-. 971, 266
S.E.2d 87, 90 (1980). See also [United States v.] Gonzalez, 214 F.3d
[I
1091, 1114 [(gth Cir.2000)]. This resolution gives full effect to the
language in I.C. § 19-2019(2), which calls for disqualification of a juror
who exhibits a state of mind that "leads to the inference that he will not act
with entire impartiality." In our view, when a juror admits bias, and gives no
unequivocal assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several efforts
by the court or counsel to elicit such an assurance, an inference that he
will not act with entire impartiality becomes inescapable.
Hauser, 143 ldaho at 609-610, 150 P.3d at 302-303. Furthermore, while not explicitly
adopting the Court of Appeals' reasoning in Hauser the ldaho Supreme Court recently
entertained an argument citing Hauser as precedent, wherein the Court did not reject
the Court of Appeals' holding; rather, the Supreme Court merely distinguished the facts
of the case presented from the facts presented in Hauser. See State v. Johnson, 145
ldaho 970, 979-980, 188 P.3d 912, 921-922 (2008)

See I.C. 3 19-2020.
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Thus, in Idaho, a defendant has a right to unbiased jurors not merely jurors who
will try to be unbiased. Furthermore, when a juror expresses a bias, the defendant has
the right to evoke an unequivocal promise from the juror that they will, in fact, be
completely unbiased or the juror should be removed for cause.
1.

Juror 608 Was Biased And Did Not Give An Unequivocal Statement That
She Would Not Hold Her Bias Aclainst Mr. Adams

Perhaps understandably, Juror 608's previous experience sitting as a juror in a
criminal trial in Ada County left her feeling like a "lab rat" and in "[slome type of
controlled experiment." (Tr., Vol.ll, p.250, Ls.14-19.) Her frustration stemmed from the
fact that she and her fellow jurors were often excused from the courtroom for what those
skilled in the law would recognize as discussions about what evidence could be
presented under the constitution and the rules of evidence. (Tr., Vol.ll, p.249, L.10 p.250, L.23.) However, for Juror 608, these discussions outside the presence of the
jury seemed like the parties keeping her from hearing all of the information she wanted
to know to decide the case. Id. Adding to her dissatisfaction was the fact that, after the
trial, the prosecutor told her the information that he could not present to her in the case,
while the defense attorney was not present, and she didn't understand why that
information could not be presented. (Tr., Vol.ll, p.249, Ls.10-23; Tr., Vo[.ll, p.312, L.14
-p.313, L.11.)
Defense counsel pointed out to Juror 608 that it was quite possible that the
parties in the present case would have to discuss issues outside of their presence and
they may have to be excused, just as had occurred in her previous jury service, and
Juror 608 candidly admitted that she could not promise not to hold it against the parties.

(Tr., Vol.ll, p.313, Ls.12-23.) When defense counsel sought an unequivocal promise
that Juror 608 would not hold her bias specifically against Mr. Adams, as is required by
Hauser, the district court forbade defense counsel from getting such a promise.
(Tr., Vol.ll, p.313, L.24 - p.314, L.5.) All counsel for Mr. Adams - and thus Mr. Adams
himself as it is his right to a fair trial and his right to an impartial jury that is at issue could get from Juror 608 was the statement, "I will do my best." (Tr., Vol.11, p.314, Ls.610.)

However, Juror 608's statement that she would "do her best" is no more

unequivocal that Juror 31's promise to "try" found insufficient in Hauser.
C.

Although Defense Counsel Did Not Seek To Remove Juror 608 For Cause. This
Court Should Review The Issue Raised Under The Doctrine Of Fundamental

Error

ldaho Criminal Rule 24(b) states the procedure by which voir dire is conducted
and allows for jurors to be removed for cause upon motion from a party. I.C.R.24(b).
When such a challenge is made, the district court's determination whether or not to
remove the juror is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Luke, 134
ldaho 294, 298, 1 P.3d 795, 799 (2000). In this case, counsel for Mr. Adams did not
move to strike Juror 608 for cause.
However, Mr. Adams asserts that Juror 608's presence and participation in his
trial should be reviewed by this Court under the doctrine of fundamental error. The
doctrine of fundamental error embodies the notion that there are some errors that are so
prejudicial and obvious, the district court must remedy them even without an objection.
The ldaho Appellate Courts may consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even
where no objection was made at trial. See e.g. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 277,

77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003); State

V.

Broadhead, 139 ldaho 663, 667, 84 P.3d 599,

603 (Ct. App. 2004).
In Idaho, fundamental error has been defined as error which goes to the
foundation or basis of a defendant's rights, goes to the foundation of the case or takes
from the defendant a right which was essential to his or her defense and which no court
could or ought to permit to be waived. Sfafe v. Babb, 125 ldaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d
905, 911 (1994). At other times, the Court has defined fundamental error simply as
"[aln error that goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights," Sfafe v. Kenner,
121 ldaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992), and "error which 'so profoundly
distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his
constitutional right to due process,"' Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 281, 77 P.3d at 970
(quoting Sfafe v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)).
Furthermore, the ldaho Supreme recently entertained a challenge to a biased
juror, raised for the first time on appeal, under the fundamental error doctrine. In
State v. Johnson, 145 ldaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008), Juror 85 expressed that he may
be unwilling to follow an instruction ordering him to disregard scientific evidence if he
believed that evidence to be solid. Id. 145 ldaho at 978-979, 188 P.3d at 920-921.
Defense counsel did not move to have Juror 85 removed for cause; however, the Court
entertained the claim under the fundamental error doctrine defining the principal as
"[elrror that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a
defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a
right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him
to waive." Id. 145 ldaho at 979, 188 P.3d at 921. The Court went on to recognize,

"[elach case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its own merits. Out of the
facts in each case will arise the law." Id. (citations omitted). Ultimately, the Johnson
Court found that there was no error and, thus, did not engage in an analysis as to
whether the error was fundamental. Id. 145 ldaho at 979-980, 188 P.3d at 921-922.
It cannot reasonably be argued that a defendant can have a fair trial, the most
basic notion of the requirement of due process, if a biased person sits on the jury. As
articulated above, the fundamental rights to a fair trial and to a jury trial encompass the
right to jurors who will put aside any biases they may have a decide the case based
strictly upon the facts they find and the application of those facts to the law as they are
instructed.

The Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States

Constitution guarantee both the right to a jury trial and the right to a fair trial. U.S.
CONST.amend. V, VI, XIV. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that in
essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel
of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992).
Furthermore, although Mr. Adams was not de lure precluded from seeking to
remove Juror 608 for cause due to her bias, he was de facto precluded from doing just
that. Counsel for Mr. Adams sought an unequivocal promise from Juror 608 that, even
if she would hold her bias against the state and the defense generally, she would not
hold that bias specifically against Mr. Adams. (Tr., Vol.11, p.313, L.12

- p.314, L.2.)

Under ldaho law, Mr. Adams had the right to ensure that Juror 608 would, in fact,
promise not to hold any bias she had against him. See Hauser, 143 ldaho at 609-610,
150 P.3d at 302-303. Yet, the district court precluded Mr. Adams' counsel from seeking

such an assurance by stating, "Counsel, with all due respect, I'm not going to allow you
to require her to promise." (Tr., Vol.ll, p.314, Ls.3-5.)
In essence, the district court had already ruled that a failure of Juror 608 to give
an unequivocal promise not to hold her bias against Mr. Adams was not a basis to
remove her for cause. Although no motion to remove for cause was actually made and,
thus, this Court has no occasion to determine whether the district court abused its
discretion, the district court's preemptive ruling that counsel for Mr. Adams could not
obtain an unequivocal promise is inconsistent with applicable legal standards."

In

essence, even a timely motion to remove Juror 608 for cause would not have cured the
error. This Court should review Juror 608's participation in the jury for fundamental
error.
1.

Fundamental Error Occurred When The District Court Failed To Remove
Juror 608 After She Expressed A Bias And Stated That She Would Merely
Do Her Best Not To Hold Her Bias Against Mr. Adams

As articulated above, Juror 608 felt like a "lab rat" and in "[s]ome type of
controlled experiment" in her previous jury service in an Ada County criminal trial. Her
displeasure stemmed from the fact that she, and her fellow jurors, were constantly being
sent out of the jury room while the prosecutor, defense, and court made determinations
as to what information they could hear. Juror 608 stated unequivocally that she would

When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. Sfate v. Hedger, 115 ldaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989), citing
Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beefs, 112 ldaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App.
1987).

not promise not to hold her bias against counsel for Mr. Adams and merely stated that
she would do her best not to hold it against Mr. Adams specifically.

Because

Mr. Adams, like all people accused of committing a crime in the State of ldaho, enjoys a
right be tried in front of jurors who can unequivocally promise not to hold any biases
they may have against the defendant, the district court erred in failing to remove Juror
608. Fundamental error occurred depriving Mr. Adams of his basic right to a fair trial in
front of impartial jurors.
2.

The Error Was Not Harmless

Generally, even though an error may constitute fundamental error, such error
does not automatically require reversal. See State v. Chrisfiansen, 144 ldaho 463,
471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87
S. Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Robbins, 123 ldaho 527, 850 P.2d 176
(1993)). "[Blefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), accord, State v.
Robbins, 123 ldaho 527, 850 P.2d 176 (1993).
Mr. Adams asserts that the error in this case cannot be held harmless.

In

Hauser, although the a timely motion to remove the biased juror for cause was issued,
because the Juror 31 failed to give an unequivocal assurance that he would not be
biased against the defendant, the Court of Appeals held, "On this record we cannot be
confident Juror 31 acted as a fair and impartial fact-finder. We therefore hold the district
court erred in failing to excuse Juror 31 for cause. Hauser was thus deprived of her
constitutional right to an impartial jury and is entitled to a new trial." Hauser, 143 ldaho

at 611, 150 P.3d at 304. Like the juror in Hauser, albeit through no fault of her own as
the district court deprived defense counsel the ability to require an unequivocal
assurance, Juror 608 failed to unequivocally state that she would not hold her bias
against Mr. Adams. Her willingness to give her best effort to do so does not remedy the
error.
Even if this Court digs deeper into the facts of this case, the record reveals that
the very procedure that dissatisfied Juror 608 with the legal process in her previous jury
experience occurred on nine separate occasions.

Admittedly, on some of these

occasions, Juror 608 and her fellow jurors was made aware only that the parties needed
to discuss issues outside their presence without any specific knowledge that the parties
would be discussing what piece of evidence or testimony was being discussed. (See
Tr., Vol.lll, p.174, Ls.10-17 (at the conclusion of a witnesses testimony, jurors excused
after prosecutor informs court that the parties need to have a discussion outside their
presence); Tr., Vol.ll1, p.369, L.8

- p.370, L.5 (same); Tr.,

Vol.lll, p.656, L.19 - p.657,

L.6 (same); Tr., Vol.ll, p.686, L.18 - p.687, L.5 (immediately after the state rested,
defense counsel stated that he had a motion to make outside the presence of the jury)).
However, on other occasions, Juror 608 was made perfectly aware that the jury
was being excused in order for the parties to discuss evidentiary issues.

(See

Tr., Vol.ll1, p.263, L.8 - p.277, L.30 (jury made aware that the parties need to discuss
State's Exhibits 14, 15, 16, and 17 wherein all of the exhibits were eventually admitted);
Tr., Vol.lll, p.528, L.7 - p.533, L.19 (same regarding State's Exhibits 48, 48A, and 49).
Three other incidents are even more prejudicial to Mr. Adams when considering
Juror 608's stated bias. First, when Mr. Campbell was testifying, he was shown the

statement he wrote out for police the night of the incident, identified as Defense Exhibit
A. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.121, L.15 - p.122, L.5.) On re-direct, the State offered Defense Exhibit
A, defense counsel stat that "there might . . . need to be a discussion about that," and
the court excused the jury. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.149, L.5 - p.150, L.9.) Defense Exhibit A was
not admitted and, because of Mr. Adams' counsel, Juror 608 never learned what was in
Mr. Campbell's written statement. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.151, Ls.10-16.) Later, the prosecutor
elicited testimony from Deputy Miller who responded to the scene on the night of the
incident. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.427, L.4 - p.430, L.2) Deputy Miller then testified that he had a
recording of his interactions with people" on the night of the incident. (Tr., Vol.lll,
p.439, L.22 - p.442, L.9.) Counsel for Mr. Adams then stated, "Judge, there has to be a
discussion if the State is attempting to do what I presume they are attempting to do. I
think we talked about this already.

I've made my intention know to the Court."

(Tr., Vol.lll, p.442, Ls.10-14.) The district court dismissed the jury. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.442,
Ls.15-20.) Because of Mr. Adams' counsel, the audio recording was not admitted into
evidence and Juror 608 never heard what was on that tape. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.449, Ls.1213.)
Perhaps the most damning piece of evidence that Juror 608 was made aware
existed, but did not know what the evidence consisted of, was caused by the State's
own witness blurting out an unsolicited statement. Deputy Faulhaber testified that she
was one of the officers assigned to look for Mr. Adams and arrest him. (Tr., Vol.lll,
p.548, L.14

- p.552,

L.14.)

In response to the question "what happened when he

" Due to the nature of the questioning immediately prior to the jury being excused, it is
quite possible that the jury was not aware of what conversation Deputy Miller recorded.

20

showed up?" Deputy Faulhaber testified, "A white car pulled up. We ordered the two
males in the car out. I recognized the driver as Clayton Adams. I'd dealt with him
before." (Tr., Vol.lll, p.552, L.15 - p.553, L.2.) Defense counsel immediately objected
and stated, "I ask for a cautionary instruction at this point. I think that's appropriate. In
fact, I have a motion in the absence of the jury." (Tr., Vol.lll, p.553, Ls.3-6.) The jury
was sent out, and because of Mr. Adams' counsel, neither Juror 608 nor any other juror
heard any more testimony from Deputy Faulhaber about the details of how she had
"dealt with" Mr. Adams before this time. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.553, L.7 - p.558, L.3.)
In all nine of the above instances, Juror 608 was made aware that she and her
fellow jurors were not getting the full picture. Of particular concern are the two incidents
where Juror 608 was made aware that the state wanted to show her pieces of evidence
concerning the what occurred the night of the incident, but she was denied the ability to
view that evidence, and the incident where Deputy Faulhaber testified that she had
"dealt with" Mr. Adams in the past, and defense counsel successfully kept her from
hearing about this or these prior dealing(s). It must be emphasized that in her previous
jury experience, after the trial and in the absence of the defense attorney, the
prosecutor told Juror 608 information about the case the prosecutor could not give them
during the trial. She very candidly admitted that she did not like that and that she would
not promise not to hold that type of withholding of information against Mr. Adams.
Mr. Adams respectfully asserts that this Court cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that permitting Juror 608 to sit in judgment of him was harmless in light of the fact
that the very process Juror 608 despised occurred on multiple occasions, and that she

was well aware that the process deprived her the ability to review all of the evidence
that she knew existed, but was inadmissible.

The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Adams' Due Process Right To A Fair Trial Bv Committing
Misconduct In Appealing To The Passions And Preiudices Of The Jurv BV Asking Them
To Provide "Justice" To The Alleqed Victims And "Justice" To Mr. Adams
A.

Introduction
Rather than merely asking the jury to base its decision on the facts and the law,

the prosecutor committed misconduct by appealing to the passions and prejudices of
the jury by exclaiming that the State was seeking "justice" for Mikeal Campbell, Stephen
Maylin, and Tyler Gorely, and by seeking "justice" for Clayton Adams. Because the
right to a fair trial includes the right to have one's guilt or innocence determined by
neutral and detached triers of fact, rather that advocates for justice, Mr. Adams was
denied his right to a fair trial.

B.

Prosecutorial Misconduct Jurisprudence
A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is protected by the due process clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 13 of the ldaho Constitution. U.S CONST.
amd XIV; ID.CONSTart. 1 § 13. The right to a fair trial includes the right to be free from
prosecutorial misconduct. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, "Society wins
not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."

Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). A prosecutor has a duty to refrain from taking
actions that deny a defendant that basic right. In State v. Wilbanks, 95 ldaho 346, 509

P.2d 331 (1973), the ldaho Supreme Court, when reviewing a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct, quoted the language of the United States Supreme Court which found:
'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.'
Id. at 353-354, 509 P.2d at 338, 339 (quoting Berger v. Unifed Sfafes, 295 U.S. 78, 88
( I 935) (emphasis added)).
In Sfafe v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007), the ldaho Court
of Appeals analyzed whether the prosecutor's comments to the jury that they may be
"irritated" and "upset" at the defense case, made during the rebuttal portion of closing
arguments, constituted misconduct. Id. The Court found, "Closing argument 'serves to
sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case."'
Phillips, 144 ldaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587 (quoting Herring v.-New York, 422 U.S. 853,
862 (1975).) "Its purpose 'is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and
interpret the evidence."' Id. (quoting State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445, 450, 816 P.2d
1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991).) "'Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their
respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom."' Id.
144 ldaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77
P.3d 956, 969 (2003)') However, that latitude has its limits and "appeals to emotion,

passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible."
Id. (citations omitted).

In cases such as this where there is no objection to the prosecutor's statments,
prosecutorial misconduct can be reviewed for fundamental error.

Prosecutorial

misconduct "rises to the level of fundamental error only if the acts or comments
constituting the misconduct are so egregious or inflammatory that any ensuing prejudice
could not have been be remedied by a curative jury instruction." State v. Kuhn, 139
ldaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Smith, 117 ldaho
891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990); State

v. Lovelass, 133 ldaho 160, 167, 983 P.2d

233, 240 (Ct. App. 1999)). The Court's inquiry is two-fold: 1) whether the conduct
complained of was improper; and, 2) if so, did it violate the defendant's right to a fair trial
or can the appellate court declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have
reached the same verdict and thus was harmless. State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445,
448, 816 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Hodges, 105 ldaho 588, 671
P.2d 1051 (1983); State v. Garcia, 100 ldaho 108, 594 P.2d 146 (1979)).
C.

The Prosecutor's Arqument Was Improper And Thus Constituted Misconduct
Because The Prosecutor Appealed To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury
Durina Closina Argument
In their rebuttal closing argument, the state argued "I just want to make it real

clear what it is that we are asking for. We are asking for justice." (Tr., Vol.lll, p.973,
Ls.22-23 (emphasis added).) The state continued:
We spoke at the beginning about how on March Ilth
of '06, Clayton
Adams was in the driver's seat, how he's not anymore, that you are. And
as you take that wheel and we slide into the back seat, mere passengers
at this point, we ask one thing, that you take us home, home to justice,
justice for Mike Campbell who watched his friend die, justice for Stephen

Maylin who got stabbed trying to run away from someone he didn't even
know, justice for Tyler Gorley whose death is the reason we are here and
whose life is insulted by the story that he wants you to believe, and justice
for Clayton Adams who did these things, who you know committed these
crimes, and who thought so little of it, that he went and bought beer.
We ask for justice. Thank you.
(Tr., Vol.lll, p.974, L.12 - p.975, L.l (emphasis added).) Broadly speaking, by asking
the jury to take "us" ... "home to justice" the prosecutor broadly appealed to the
passions and the prejudices of the jury. Analyzed in more detail, the egregiousness of
the conduct becomes more clear.
The 'Tustice" for Mike Campbell was supposedly in restitution of him having to
"watch his friend die." While certainly Mr. Campbell witnessing the death of his friend
would be traumatic for him, it is not the jury's duty to provide him with comfort, or
satisfaction, or 'Tustice." It was the jury's duty to determine whether he was the victim of
an attempted assault. Furthermore, the State asked the jury to provide 'Tustice" for
Tyler Gorley by arguing that his life is insulted by Mr. Adams' claim of self defense. The
jury, however, was not to determine whether Mr. Gorley's life was insulted by
Mr. Adams' self-defense claim; rather, it was to decide whether Mr. Adams self-defense
claim justified his killing of Mr. Gorley. Finally, the State sought "justice" for Mr. Adams
because he "committed these crimes, and who thought so little of it, that he went and
bought beer." However, the jury was not there to give Mr. Adams 'Tustice" or whether
he should be punished for buying beer. They were there to determine whether or not he
was guilty.
None of the State's argument cited above can even remotely be considered part
of the wide latitude that attorneys are afforded in closing arguments. The State's
arguments cited above are more closely described as being considered part of the wide

latitude that attorneys are afforded when making an argument for an appropriate
sentence. it is for the sentencing judge to determine what "justice" a defendant should
receive upon conviction of a crime - it is not for the jury to determine whether 'Tustice"
requires a conviction in the first place. As such, the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct.

0.

The Prosecutor's Misconduct Deprived Mr. Adams Of His Riaht To A Fair Trial
And Was Not Harmless
Mr. Adams asserts that this Court cannot declare, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the jury would have returned the same verdict absent the prosecutor inappropriately
asking them to impose "justice." As articulated previously in the "Statement of the Facts
and Course of Proceedings" section of this brief, the jury heard conflicting testimony
about what transpired on the night of the incident. Mr. Campbell and Mr. Maylin testified
that Mr. Adams first demanded money threatening them if they did not give it to him,
then, unprovoked, stabbed Mr. Maylin once, and stabbed Mr. Gorley repeatedly ending
his life. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.61, L.2 - p.154, L.1 (testimony of Mikeal Campbell); Tr., Vol.lll,
p.238, L.l

- p.310,

L.12 (testimony of Stephen Maylin).) Mr. Madrigal, testified that

Mr. Adams asked the three passengers in the back seat to "pitch in" for gas, could not
hear their response, Mr. Adams got mad and slammed the brakes, but he did not see
what happened after that. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.310, L.21 - p.369, L.14 (testimony of Sergio
Madrigal).) Mr. Adams testified that he was acting in self-defense, and that it was
Mr. Maylin and Mr. Gorley who threatened then attacked him and he did only what he
had to do to protect himself. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.722, L.15 - p.842, L.6; p.859, L.13 - p.886,
L . l l (testimony of Clayton Adams).)

The prosecutor asked the jury to find Mr. Adams guilty of one count of first
degree murder, three counts of attempted robbery, and one count of aggravated
battery. (Tr., Vol.lll, p.924, L15 - p.945, L.12, p.973, L.12

- p.975, L.1.)

Mr. Adams

claimed self-defense. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.722, L. 15 - p.842, L.6; p.859, L.13 - p.886, L. 11
(testimony of Clayton Adams).)

Counsel for Mr. Adams, in essence, argued that

Mr. Adams was guilty of no more than voluntary manslaughter, and no less. (Tr., Vol.lll,
p.945, L.17 - p.971, L.13.) The jury found somewhere in the middle, finding Mr. Adams
guilty of second degree murder and aggravated battery, but not guilty of first degree
murder and three counts of attempted robbery. (R., pp.157-161.) Mr. Adams asserts
that this Court cannot find, beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached
the same conclusion had the prosecutor not asked the jury to seek "~ustice"for all
involved, and asks this Court to vacate his conviction.

The Combination Of The Above Errors, Even If lndividuallv Harmless, Reauire Reversal
Of Mr. Adams' Convictions Under The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error
In Sfafe v. Harrison, 136 ldaho 504, 37 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2001), the ldaho Court of
Appeals stated that under the doctrine of cumulative error, the, "accumulation of
irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in the aggregate show the
absence of a fair trial." Id. at 508, 37 P.3d at 5 (citations omitted). Mr. Adams asserts
the above errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial and were, individually, not
harmless.

However, even if this Court finds the above errors to be individually

harmless, Mr. Adams asserts that the combination of errors deprived him of a fair trial
and require reversal.

Mr. Adams stood trial in front of a juror who specifically stated that she would not
promise not to hold what she would interpret as being the withholding of information,
against the defense. Defense counsel was deprived his ability to at least get Juror 608
to promise not to hold her admitted prejudice against Mr. Adams individually, but the
court would only allow him to get the jury to agree to do her best. See supra,
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1.

Furthermore, the prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of Juror 608,
along with the other jurors, when he asked them to give "justice" to the alleged victims
and to Mr. Adams. See supra, § 11. This unlawful appeal to the passions and prejudices
of the jury, especially Juror 608 who was required only to do her best to side aside her
candidly admitted prejudice, deprived Mr. Adams of his right to a fair trial and requires
reversal of his conviction.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion Bv Executinq An Excessive Sentence Upon
Mr. Adams In Liaht Of His Youna Age, The Role Alcohol Plaved In The Instant Offense
And His Desire For Treatment, The Support He Eniovs From His Familv And Friends,
And His Remorse
A.

Introduction
The death of Tyler Gorley is a tragedy, as was the non-lethal stabbing of Stephen

Maylin. If Mr. Adams' conviction is allowed to stand, a prison sentence is certainly
appropriate.

However, the length of the prison sentence executed in this case,

Mr. Adams asserts, is excessive in light of all of the facts and circumstances in this
case, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Executing An Excessive Sentence
Upon Mr. Adams In Liaht Of His Youna Age, The Role Alcohol Plaved In The
Instant Offense And His Desire For Treatment, The Support He Eniovs From His
Family And Friends, And His Remorse
Mr. Adams asserts that, given any view of the facts, his total unified sentence of

life,'' with twenty-eight years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 ldaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982).
The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[wlhere a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cofton, I00 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75
(1979)). Mr. Adams does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Adams must show that in light
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.
Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled

on other grounds by Sfate v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992)). The
governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation;

" Technically,

Mr. Adams was sentenced to a unified life term, with twenty-five years
fixed, for the murder conviction and a consecutive unified ten year sentence, with three
years fixed, making his total unified sentence life plus ten years, with twenty-eight years
fixed. Practically speaking, Mr. Adams will be required to serve at least twenty-eight
years and is subject to either parole or incarceration for the rest of his life.

and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting Stafe v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho
382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).)
Clayton Adams was a young man of the age of 22 when this incident occurred
and he was 23 when the district court sent him to prison possibly for the rest of his life.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinaffer, PSI), pp.1-3.) ldaho Courts recongnize
that young offenders should be treated more leniently that older, professional criminals.
See State v. Dunnagan, 101 ldaho 125, 126, 609 P.2d 657, 658 (1980); Stafe v.
Adams, 99 ldaho 75, 577 P.2d 1123 (1978) (dissent, J. Bistline).,

Not only was Mr. Adams only 22 at the time of the crime, he was under the
influence of alcohol. (PSI p l ) Having started drinking at the age of 16, Mr. Adams
had been drinking regularly during the period of time surrounding the incident. (PSI,
I 1 . Mr. Adams informed the court that his decision to go out and drink that night was
a bad choice that stemmed from his immaturity. (Tr., Vol.lV, p.83, Ls.2-10.) His father,
Gary Adams stated that couldn't help but blame himself in part for what occurred
because of his own alcoholism and his belief that he passed it on to his son.
(Tr., Vol.lV, p.49, Ls.3-25.) The ldaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse
should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes
sentence. Sfate v. Nice, 103 ldaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982). In Nice, the ldaho
Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact
that "the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant's alcoholic
problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested
alternatives for treating the problem." Id. at 91, 645 P.2d at 325. The ldaho Supreme
Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to

appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn,
102 Idaho 405, 408, 631 P.2d 187, 190 (1981). Mr. Adams himself recognizes that he
has a problem with alcohol and has a desire to seek treatment. (PSI, p.11.)
In addition Mr. Adams enjoys the strong support of his family members and
friends. Numerous letters of support were submitted to the court. Mr. Adams' parents,
siblings, grandmother, and others all wrote letters of support generally describing him as
a kind-hearted person who was always willing to help other. (Letter from Gary Adams;
Letter from Laurie Adams; Letter from Melissa Koplin; Letter from Justin Adams; Ashley
Adams; Letter from Alle Jeneca Adams; Letter from Linda Doane; Letter from Rebecca
McDaniel; Letter from Candis Astolfi.) Furthermore, numerous letters were submitted
by friends and fellow church members of Mr. Adams who also recognized him as a kind
and religious person who puts the needs of others in front of his own. (Letter from
Thelma Rice; Letter from Eilene Cook; Letter from Gilberto Bravo Jr.; Letter from Marvin
Moore; Letter from Lois Moore; Letter from Harold Garner; Letter from Lori Blair; Letter
from Julie Michalec; Letter from Ed Quiring; Letter from Wilber and Donna Richards;
Letter from Sharon Monks; Letter from Daniel Kruse; Letter from Cindi Anderson; Letter
from Pastor Frank Munsey; Letter from Carl Zumwalt; Letter from Arline Goertz; Letter
from Lacey Morrison; Letter from Lois McMillan; Letter from Kimberly Buhain; Letter
from Pat Todd; Letter from Nathan Geier; Letter from Susan and Dallas Kraft.)
Additionally, during the sentencing hearing, Gary Adams, Mr. Adams' father,
Justin and Travis Adams, Mr. Adams' brothers, his friends Jennifer Zumwalt, Gilbert
Bravo, and Cindi Anderson, and his friends in his church community Mawin Moore, Lois
Moore, Sharon Monks and Pastor Bruce Jewel all gave statements in support of

Mr. Adams. (Tr., Vol.lV, p.48, L.9 - p.71, L.13.) The general thrust of these statements
were that Mr. Adams is a kind and caring person who is strong in his faith, and who is
trying to improve his life. Id. ldaho courts recognized that the support of family and
friends is a mitigating factor that should be considered by the district court when
fashioning an appropriate sentence. See State v. Shideler, 103 ldaho 593, 594, 651
P.2d 527, 528 (1982) (reducing sentence of first-time offender who accepted
responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in his rehabilitation efforts);
State

V.

Carrasco, 114 ldaho 348, 354-55, 757 P.2d 211, 217-18 (Ct. App. 1988),

overruled on other grounds, 117 ldaho 295, 787 P.2d 281 (1990) (reducing sentence of
first-time offender who had a family depending upon him for support, accepted
responsibility, offense at issue)
Finally, Mr. Adams is deeply remorseful for the role he played in the death of
Mr. Gorley. Mr. Adams stated, "I want to start by expressing my deepest apologies to
all of Tyler's family. I want you to know that the magnitude of my emotions, my regret,
and grief cannot begin to be explained through these words." (Tr., Vol.lV, p.79, L.23 p.80, L.1.) Mr. Adams also stated:

I don't want you to have the impression that I'm not remorseful for
the lack of emotion shown in my trial. I've never been able to express my
emotions, especially in front of people, because I feel embarrassed or not
strong enough.
I am truly sorry that my actions caused the death of your son, and I
would take his place if I could. And I will continue to grieve for you and for
Tyler until the day I die.
(Tr., Vol.lV, p.81, Ls.1-9.) The issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant
expresses remorse has been addressed in several cases. For example, in State v.

Alberts, 121 ldaho 204, 824 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991), the ldaho Court of Appeals noted

that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his
conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other
positive attributes of his character." Id. at 209, 824 P.2d at 140.
Alberts was convicted of two charges of sexual abuse of children under the age
of sixteen and the district court imposed a sentence of fifteen years for each of the two
charges to be served consecutively, with minimum periods of confinement of five years
on each charge. Id. at 206, 824 P.2d at 136. Based on a psychological evaluation,
which stated that Alberts exhibited a great deal of remorse about the harm he brought to
his victims and was therefore an ideal candidate for treatment, the court modified his
sentences to run concurrently. Id. at 209, 824 P.2d at 140. The court noted that Alberts
should be able to benefit, if at all, from whatever rehabilitative programs are available
through the Board of Corrections within a fifteen-year period. Id.
Mr. Adams asserts that the district court abused its discretion by executing an
excessive sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand
his case to the district court. Alternatively, Mr. Adams requests that this Court reduce
his sentences as it deems appropriate.
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